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Abstract
The  author  examines the  emergence  of  a  transnational  private  law  in  alternative  dispute
resolution bodies and private norm formulating agencies from a reflexive law perspective.
After introducing the concept of reflexive law he applies the idea of law as a communicative
system to the ongoing debate on the existence of a New Law Merchant or lex mercatoria. He
then  discusses  some  features  of  international  commercial  arbitration  (e.g.  the  lack  of
transparency)  which  hinder  self-reference  (autopoiesis)  and  thus  the  production  of  legal
certainty in lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal system. He then contrasts these findings
with the Domain Name Dispute Resolution System, which as opposed to Lex Mercatoria was
rationally planned and highly formally organised by WIPO and ICANN, and which is allowing
for self-reference and thus is designed as an autopoietic legal system, albeit with a very
limited scope, i.e. the interference of abusive domain name registrations with trademarks
(cybersquatting).  From  the  comparison  of  both  examples  the  author  derives  some
preliminary  ideas  regarding  a  theory  of  reflexive  transnational  law,  suggesting  that  the
established general trend of privatisation of civil law need to be accompanied by a civilisation
of private law, i.e. the constitutionalization of transnational private regimes by embedding
them into a procedural constitution of freedom.
I. Introduction
What is transnational law?
1 With the rise of the modern territorial state a very strong
tradition of defining law as the law of a nation state was established, i.e. a domestic
legal system where lawmaking is ultimately legitimized by the national sovereign, and
which is administered by the state’s court system. Matters related to more than one
country, hence, are regulated by “(public) international law”, i.e. a [186] body of rules
that control or  affect predominantly  the  rights  of  states  in  their  relation  with  each
other,  and  successively  the  rights  of  international  organisations  and  even  of
individuals in their relations to states when public international factors are involved.
This “law of nations” is based on international treaties, general principles of law, and
the customs and usages of civilized nations as generally accepted as binding and
enforceable  by  the  participant  nations  and  as  expressed  in  the  decisions  of
international tribunals and (in Europe) the opinions of text writers.
2 On the other hand
                                                
1  The work on this article was funded by the VolkswagenStiftung. The part on lex mercatoria was
presented in October 2001 in Münster at the CENTRAL Conference on “Transnational Business
in the Age of Globalization”, further research was conducted in Winter 2001/02. The related work
of Dirk Lehmkuhl (The Resolution of Domain Names vs. Trademark Conflicts: A Case Study on
the Regulation Beyond the Nation State, Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 2002, 61 ff.) and the
fundamental  work  of  Mathias  Albert  (Zur  Politik  der  Weltgesellschaft,  Identität  und  Recht  im
Kontext internationaler Vergesellschaftung, Weilerswist 2002) were published after submission of
this text, but could be taken into account during a revision in summer 2002. The work of Carl
Peter Kleidat on lex mercatoria and systems theory, which was awarded with a study prize in
February 2002 (see the report of Machura, ZfRSoz 2002, 149, 153), was not available to the
author. I wish to thank Mathias Albert, Klaus Peter Berger, Dirk Lehmkuhl, Lord Mustill, Gunther
Teubner and Peer Zumbansen for discussion and comments.
2  On  the  concept  and  evolution  of  (public)  international  law  see:  Verdross/Simma,  Universelles
Völkerrecht, 3rd ed., Berlin 1984 at 1-7; Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 4th ed., München 1999, at 1 et seq.;2
“private  international  law”  –  with  the  exception  of  some  international  treaties
harmonisation (e.g. the Rome Convention) and uniform private law (e.g. the CISG) –
essentially is a set of domestic rules regarding the conflict of national private laws
applicable to cross-border transactions.
3 The law of nations, thus, is a law between
nations  (ius  inter  gentes),  thereby  stressing  the  political  competition  between
sovereign nation states rather than global interdependence.
The  meaning  of  the  prefix  “trans-“  as  distinguished  from  “inter-“  is  “across,
beyond,  through”.  Transnational  thus  indicates  something  which  extends  or  goes
beyond national boundaries. The concept of „transnational law“ as first articulated by
Phillip C. Jessup, Judge of the International Court of Justice, comprises all law which
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. It includes both civil and
criminal aspects, what is known as public and private international law, as well as
both public and private national law. Moreover, transnational situations may involve
not only states, but individuals, corporations, and other groups.
4 In this perspective
transnational law is conceived more broadly than (public) international law, by means
of a functional definition addressing all kinds of cross-border issues and stressing the
role of private actors in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world. Several
U.S. journals dedicated to this concept, consequently, publish material on all aspects
of international and comparative law, both public and private.
5
In the context of international commercial law, however, the term transnational
law is used in a different, much more specific way: transnational (commercial) law
here denotes a third category of law somewhere in between the traditional dichotomy
of  [187]  municipal  laws  and  (public)  international  law,
6  i.e.  an  autonomous  legal
system beyond the state, based on general principles and rules of law, derived from
a functional comparative analysis of the “common core” of domestic legal systems
(e.g. the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the like)
7,
and also based on the usages and customs of the international business community
(e.g. standard contract forms, general business conditions, etc.)
8, and administered
by international commercial arbitration.
9 This New Law Merchant or lex mercatoria is,
of course, the most prominent example for the general trend of the privatisation of
civil law.
10 The concept of a third-level of transnational law beyond municipal and
                                                                                                                                                        
Seidl-Hohenveldern/Stein,  Völkerrecht,  10th  ed.,  Köln  2000,  at  1,  and  at  12  et  seq.  (on  its
distinction from related fields like private international law).
3  See Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, 8th ed., München 2000, at 4-24 (on the concept
and its distinction from public international law), 69 et seq. (on harmonization and uniform law);
Kroppholler, Internationales Privatrecht, 4th ed., Tübingen 2001, §§ 1, 8, 9, 12.
4  Jessup, Transnational Law, 1956, at 2 et seq.
5  Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (http://law.vanderbilt.edu/journal/history.html); Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law (www.columbia.edu/cu/jtl/); Journal of Transnational Law & Policy
(www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational);  Transnational  Law  &  Contemporary  Problems
(www.uiowa.edu/).
6  Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer 1999, at 40, 42f.
7  Bonell,  The  UNIDROIT  Principles  and  Transnational  Law,  in:  Berger  (ed.),  The  Practice  of
Transnational Law, Kluwer 2001, 23-41.
8  Garro,  Rule-Setting  by  Private  Organizations,  Standardization  of  Contracts,  and  the
Harmonization  of  International  Sales  Law,  in:  Fletcher/  Mistelis/  Cremona,  Foundations  and
Perspectives of International Trade Law, London 2001, 310.
9  For an exhaustive overview of the debate see Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global
Market Place, in: Berger (ed.) (supra note 7) 1-22.
10  See  Hadfield,  Privatizing  Commercial  Law,  Regulation  2001,  40-45,  available  at3
(public) international law may, however, be generalized in that there are all kinds of
spontaneous or formalised, private or hybrid, transnational legal regimes, including,
but  not  limited  to  commercial  law.
11  Such  “functional,  overlapping  and  competing
jurisdictions”
12 evolve around specific problems in functionally differentiated parts of
global society, i.e. their emergence is issue-focused and conflict-driven. The resulting
transnational  legal  pluralism
13  may  be  understood  as  a  result  of  the  normative
vacuum that is left by national and public international law in a globalized world.
14
Whereas  the  former,  very  broad  concept  of  transnational  law  became  quite
popular in the general context of increasing global interdependence, and lately as
well  with  contributions  addressing  the  issue  of  extraterritorial  effects  of  domestic
[188] laws,
15 it did not prevail in legal doctrine of either public or private international
law.
16 The reason might be found in its vague ambiguity, for it is not the law but
rather the regulated issues which are transnational.
17 On the other hand, the latter
concept  of  a  third-level,  autonomous  legal  system  ultimately  based  in  private
autonomy seems to be quite an exciting idea, which in respect of lex mercatoria has
attracted for more than forty years over and over again the interest and contributions
of learned writers in private law and jurisprudence, and which at the same time is of
eminent importance not only to the practice of international commerce, but generally
within the context of global governance.
18
                                                                                                                                                        
(http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n1/hadfield.pdf).
11  Teubner,  Global  private  regimes:  Neo-spontaneous  law  and  dual  constitution  of  autonomous
sectors  in  world  society?  in:  Ladeur  (ed.)  Globalization  and  Public  Governance,  Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2001; see as well the contributions to Teubner (ed.), Global Law
Without a State, Aldershot (Dartmouth) 1997.
12  The  Idea  of  FOCJ  was  coined  by  Frey/Eichenberger,  The  New  Democratic  Federalism  for
Europe, Edward Elgar 1999.
13  Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in: Teubner (ed.) (supra note 11)
3-28; K. v. Benda-Beckmann, Transnational Dimensions of Legal Pluralism, in: W. Fikentscher,
Begegnung und Konflikt – Eine kulturanthropologische Bestandsaufnahme, München 2001.
14  Berger  (supra  note  9)  at  14;  G.  Calliess,  Globale  Kommunikation  –  staatenloses  Recht,  in:
Anderheiden/Huster/Kirste, Globalisierung als Problem von Gerechtigkeit und Steuerungsfähigkeit
des Rechts, ARSP Beiheft 79, Stuttgart 2001, 61-79; Lehmkuhl (supra note 1).
15  For the sociological debate on a “new transnationalism”, transnational NGOs, transnational firms,
and a global civil society see Heins, Der neue Transnationalismus, Frankfurt/Main 2001; for a use
of  the  term  transnational  law  in  a  very  broad  sense,  indicating  in  the  tradition  of  Huntington
(Transnational Organizations in World Politics, in: 25 World Politics (1973) at 333-368), that such
law  with  respect  to  its  non-multilateral  sources  rather  is  a  geographical  extension  of  OECD-
Members legal culture than a global law, see Günther, Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code
der Legalität: Globalisierung als  rechtstheoretisches  Problem,  in:  Wingert/Günther  (Hrsg.),  Die
Öffentlichkeit  der  Vernunft  und  die  Vernunft  der  Öffentlichkeit,  FS  Habermas,  Frankfurt/Main
2001, 539 et seq; for the use of the term in the context of German and European administrative
law see Ruffert, Der Transnationale Verwaltungsakt, in: 34 Die Verwaltung (2001) at 453-485; see
also Horn (The Use of Transnational Law in the Contract Law of International Trade and Finance,
in: Berger (ed.) (supra note 7) at 67), who confines the term to transnational sources of law,
thereby excluding domestic laws, but as opposed to Berger still including public international law
like the CISG or other treaties as well as the supranational European law, i.e. the EU and EC
treaties and EC regulations, but not the EC directives which have to be implemented by national
laws.
16  See Seidl-Hohenveldern/Stein (supra note 2) at 14; Kegel/Schurig (supra note 3) at 23; Kropholler
(supra note 3) at 95.
17  See Horn (supra note 15) at 67.
18  In the context of internet governance see e.g. Perritt, Cyberspace Self-Government: Town-Hall
Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism, 12 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 413 (1997); Perritt, The Internet is4
For the purposes of this article transnational law, therefore, shall be defined as a
third-level autonomous legal system beyond municipal and public international law,
created and developed by the law-making forces of an emerging global civil society,
founded on general principles of law as well as  societal usages, administered  by
private dispute resolution service providers, and codified (if at all) by private norm
formulating agencies.
Such a definition of transnational law is, of course, heavily contested in the realm
of traditional legal theory, and even non-dogmatic legal positivists accept it at most
as a quasi-legal phenomenon of soft-law, existing in the shadow of the national [189]
legal systems only.
19 In the following I intend to show how the theory of reflexive law
might contribute to the debate on transnational law. After introducing the concept of
reflexive law (II.), I shall apply it to the concept of law and social norms (III.) in order
to  discuss  some  features  of  international  commercial  arbitration,  which  from  a
reflexive law perspective are crucial in the evolution of lex mercatoria towards an
autonomous  legal  system  (IV.).  I  then  briefly  introduce  the  ICANN/WIPO  Domain
Name  Dispute  Resolution Process as  a highly  formalized  system  of  transnational
(trademark) law (V.).  From the comparison of both examples I finally draw some
conclusions as to the general concept of reflexive transnational law, which combines
the established trend of the privatisation of civil law with a civilisation of private law
(VI.).
20
II.  The Concept of Reflexive Law
The term “reflexive law” was coined by Gunther Teubner in 1982.
21 Published shortly
before Helmut Kohl became German chancellor, the article was written in a context,
where the social-liberal dreams of a political reform of society, guided by scientific-
rational planning and implemented by social-engineers through the means of law,
had collapsed some years ago and the only alternative rising from the dust of general
disillusionment with a supposedly omnipotent government were the neoliberal and
neoconservative  programmes  of  Thatcherism  and  Reagonomics.  Under  these
circumstances  reflexive  law  was  a  somewhat  clairvoyant  anticipation  of  the  late-
nineties  ideas  of  Tony  Blair  and  Gerhard  Schröder  as  to  a  “third  way”  between
market and state: a civil society basically regulating itself, supported, if necessary
activated, but essentially merely framed and supervised by the State.
22 That is to say
“regulated  self-regulation”
23  is  the  core  political  concept  behind  reflexive  law.
                                                                                                                                                        
Changing the Public International Legal System, 88 KY L. REV. 885 (2000); Grewlich, Conflict
and  good  Governance  in  Cyberspace,  Multi-level  and  Multi-actor  Constitutionalisation,  in:
Engel/Keller (ed.), Governance of Global Networks in the Light of Differing Local Values, Baden-
Baden 2000, at 237 et seq.; Calliess (supra note 14).
19  See Stein, Lex Mercatoria, Realität und Theorie, Frankfurt/Main 1995; Berger (supra note 6) ch. 2.
at 43 et seq.
20  The term Civil Law is used in a broad sense, comprising not only private law but as well all kinds
of business law like commercial, intellectual property, and competition law etc. While I took my
examples here from commercial and trademark law, in another context I shall apply this concept
to cross-border consumer contract law. For some preliminary ideas see Calliess (supra note 14).
21  Teubner, Reflexives Recht, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP) 1982, 13 ff.
22  The „third way“ rhetoric draws on the ideas of A. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right. The Future of
Radical Politics, 1994; Germ. Jenseits von Links und Rechts, Frankfurt/Main 1997.
23  See the contributions to Berg et al. (ed.), Regulierte Selbstregulierung als Steuerungskonzept des
Gewährleistungsstaates,  Die  Verwaltung  Beiheft  4,  Berlin  2001;  Schulz/Held,  Regulated  Self-5
However, [190] reflexive law is not meant to be a political concept in itself. Like self-
regulation  it  is  a  concept  which  potentially  fits  all  kinds  of  policies,  from  neo-
conservative subsidiarity, over neo-liberal spontaneous ordering in free markets, to
neo-socialist  or  communitarian  ideas  of  democratic  self-government  in  small  and
cosy parts of society.
24
In terms of legal theory reflexive law is quite a German concept in that it is built –
again  as  a  kind  of  third  way  -  on  the  descriptivist  Systems  Theory  of  Niklas
Luhmann
25 and the normativist Discourse Theory of Jürgen Habermas
26. Although
Teubner’s  1989  book  on  “Law  as  Autopoietic  System”
27,  in  which  the  concept  of
reflexive  law  is  elaborated,  seems  to  be  somewhat  cynical  and,  therefore,  is
perceived to be a mere application of Systems Theory, there is still a lot of normative
hope to be found in it. That is to say, “self-regulation” symbolizes Kant’s perception of
“freedom and autonomy as self-legislation” whereas “regulated” represents Hegel’s
hope for solidarity and rational integration of society through the State.
Teubner  makes  a  creative  use  of  these  theories  by  stressing  the  similarities
rather  than  the  differences  between  them.
28  These  common  grounds  are:  Both
Luhmann and Habermas reconstruct modern society as a communicative system,
thus putting the focus neither on individuals and their actions nor on social structures
and  organisations,  but  on  the  process  of  communication.  Social  structures  like
norms,  organisations,  and  institutions  are  produced  and  reproduced  in  these
communicative processes. Since it is impossible for a social theory to predict the
actual outcome of these manifold and highly complex processes, the emphasis is on
the structures and rules which govern communication. The object of both theories,
therefore,  is  the  meta-rules  and  meta-structures  constituting  the  communication
society,  be  that  the  procedural  discourse  rules  of  Habermas,  or  the  structures  of
social systems and subsystems of Luhmann.
So how come the term “reflexive law”? The use of “reflexive” as an adjective to
law is ambiguous, thereby perfectly symbolizing the intended undecidedness of the
concept in terms of “Discourse vs. Systems Theory”. The implications are threefold:
[191] (1) “Reflexive” describes “an action that is directed back upon itself”. For
the  purposes  of  Systems  Theory  “reflexivity”  is  defined  as  the  application  of  a
process to itself, e.g. “thinking of thinking”, “communicating about communication”,
“teaching how to teach” etc. In the context of law reflexivity could be “making laws on
law-making”,  “adjudicating  on  adjudication”,  or  “regulating  self-regulation”.  It  is
obvious, that the focus of reflexive law in this context is on procedural rather than
                                                                                                                                                        
Regulation  as  a  Form  of  Modern  Government.  Study  commissioned  by  the  German  Federal
Commissioner  for  Cultural  and  Media  Affairs.  Interim  Report  (October  2001),
(www.humanrights.coe.int/media/documents/interim-report-self-regulation.pdf)
24  Teubner, Recht als autopoietisches System, Frankfurt/Main 1989, at 81; Engl. Law as Autopoietic
System, London 1993.
25  Luhmann,  Soziale  Systeme,  Frankfurt/Main  1984;  Engl.  Social  Systems,  Stanford  UP  1995;
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main 1993.
26  Habermas, Faktiziät und Geltung, Frankfurt/Main 1992; Engl. Between Facts and  Norms, MIT
Press 1996.
27  Teubner (supra note 24).
28  In his recent work, however, Teubner draws more on Derrida than on Habermas: see Teubner,
Economics of Gift - Positivity  of Justice: The  Mutual  Paranoia  of  Jacques  Derrida  and  Niklas
Luhmann, 18 Theory, Culture and Society (2001), 29-47; Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The
Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy, 31 Law and Society Review (1997), 763-787.6
substantive law, or as H.L.A. Hart
29 put it, on secondary rather than primary rules. It
follows that the term reflexive law on the level of norms marks rules of competence
and jurisdiction, of form and procedure, all of which constitute the communicative
processes by which society (including its legal system) is regulating itself. In other
words,  reflexive  law  deals  with  constitutions  in  a  broad,  non-technical  sense.
30  A
good comparison can be seen in the contemporary work being done under the label
of New Constitutional Economics.
31
(2)  Another  meaning  of  “reflexive”  is  “marked  by  or  capable  of  reflection”,
referring to “reflexion” in its philosophical meaning of introspective contemplation or
consideration of some subject matter. Here one can find the normative implications of
reflexive law as being connected with a concept of rationality. However, rationality is
not  understood  as  a  quality  of  norms,  but  rather  as  communicative  and  systems
rationality. In a nutshell, decision-making in a reflexive legal system is marked by
adequate deliberation or reasoning as well as by reflection on the specific function
and limits of law in modern society.
32 Teubner suggests that such reflection would
lead  to  a  non-interventionist  model  of  the  state  and  of  law,  the  latter  of  which
essentially limits itself to what we can call the constitutionalization of self-regulation.
33
(3) Finally, a third meaning of “reflexive” is “a relation that exists between an
entity and itself”, i.e.  a  concept of  self-reference. This  leads  us  to  the  very  basic
concept of autopoiesis. Again in a nutshell: Autopoiesis is the self-reproduction of a
system  out  of  its  own  components.  If  a  social  system  by  definition  consists  of
communications, then autopoiesis marks nothing else but the features of the system
which provide for enduring communication, so that the system will not come to a
sudden halt. The implications for law as an autopoietic system are as follows: the
core operations of the legal system, defined by itself (i.e. in secondary norms) as
legal acts, e.g. adjudicating, legislating, contracting and the like, must be linked with
each other in a way that the mere existence of one such act provokes others, making
[192] reference to the first and thereby literally producing each other. An example for
such an interlinkage of legal acts is the reference to precedent or stare decisis, by
which a judgement selectively refers to some other judgements, thereby evoking the
impression that it is a product of the quoted judgements. Another example is the
strange interrelation between statute and judgement, where the binding act of law-
making  produces  the  court  decision,  which  at  the  same  time  by  means  of
interpretation  in  the  hermeneutic  circle  first  of  all  produces  and  reproduces  the
norm.
34
                                                
29  Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961.
30  Teubner,  Global  private  regimes  (supra  note  11);  Teubner,  Contracting  Worlds:  The  many
Autonomies of private Law, 9 Social and Legal Studies (2000), 399-417.
31  Brennan/Hamlin, Constitutional  Economics, in Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, vol. I (1998), 401-410.
32  See  for  a  possible  combination  of  communicative  and  systems  rationality  G.  Calliess,
Prozedurales Recht, Baden-Baden 1999, at 169 et seq.; Teubner might be more sceptical with
regard to communicative rationality though.
33  Teubner (supra note 24) ch. 5. and (supra note 30).
34  Teubner (supra note 24) ch. 3, at 56; Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (supra note 25), ch.
2; for an introductory summary and analysis of these concepts see G. Calliess (supra note 32) at
122-141 and 145-152.7
III. Between Law and Social Norms
In  order  to  conceptualise  transnational  law  I  shall  now  explain  the  differences,
resulting from a reflexive law approach to our reflections on the concept of law and
the qualities distinguishing it from social norms. I start with a brief introduction into
international commercial arbitration and the related idea of a New Law Merchant.
Arbitration is a kind of alternative dispute resolution, where the parties essentially
agree to submit a dispute for binding decision to a private judge, chosen by them.
35
Domestic arbitration laws accept such arbitral awards as final, i.e. their validity may
be  contested  in  state  courts  on  very  limited  grounds  only,  and  provide  for  their
enforcement, if certain minimum rule-of-law conditions regarding deliberate consent
to the arbitration clause and fair trial are met. Basically the arbitral tribunal decides
the case on the same legal grounds as would a municipal judge. However, especially
with  high  value  disputes,  arbitration  is  chosen  because  it  might  be  cheaper,  and
since  there  are  no  stages of  appeal,  it  is  also  quicker  than  litigation.  In  addition,
arbitral proceedings are non-public
36 and the arbitrators can be selected according to
the necessary technical and legal expertise.
With regard to disputes resulting from cross-border transactions there are even
more  advantages. Whereas  the  parties  in  the  private  international  law  framework
have to subject themselves either to the jurisdiction of the courts of the other [193]
party’s home country or to a neutral venue,
37 where both of them are not familiar with
the  law  and  procedure,  in  international  commercial  arbitration  they  can  choose  a
neutral and convenient seat and procedure for their arbitration as well as competent
arbitrators with the necessary language skills. Moreover, under the 1958 New York
Convention such arbitral award is easily enforceable in more than 120 jurisdictions,
while an equivalent means for domestic judgements is still pending.
38
                                                
35  An Introduction is given by Berger, Understanding International Commercial Arbitration, in: Center
for  Transnational  Law  (ed.),  Understanding  Transnational  Commercial  Arbitration,  Münster
(quadis) 2001, 5-41; for the advantages of arbitration see as well De Ly, Commercial Law as a
Refuge  from  Contract  Law:  A  Comparative  and  Uniform  Law  Perspective,  45  Wayne  L.  Rev.
(2000) 1825; for the transnational  dimension see Lehmkuhl, Structuring Dispute  Resolution  in
Transnational  Trade:  Competition  and  Co-evolution  of  Public  and  Private  Institutions,  in:
Djelic/Quack (eds.), Globalisation and Institutions - redefining the Rules of the Economic Game.
Edward Elgar (forthcoming).
36  Which  does  not  necessarily  mean  confidential:  Fortier,  The  Occasionally  Unwarranted
Assumption of Confidentiality, 131 Arbitration International (1999), 15.
37  For a thorough transaction cost analysis see Mankowski, Europäisches Internationales Privat-
und Prozessrecht im Lichte der ökonomischen Analyse, in: Ott/Schäfer (ed.), Vereinheitlichung
und Diversität des Zivilrechts in transnationalen Wirtschaftsräumen, 2002, 118-151, promoting the
advantages  of  European  harmonisation  (Rome  Convention)  and  cooperation  (Brussels
Regulation) in limiting forum shopping; for the limits of harmonisation approaches see Ferrari,
'Forum Shopping` Despite International Uniform Contract Law Conventions, 51 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (2002), 689-707.
38  The “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” as well as its
status are available at (http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm). See also Nienaber, The Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in: Center for Transnational Law (ed.) (supra note
35),  99-123;  Information  on  the  future  “Hague  Convention  on  International  Jurisdiction  and
Foreign  Judgements  in  Civil  and  Commercial  Matters”  is  available  at
(http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html); see as well Zekoll, "Could a Treaty Trump Supreme
Court Jurisdictional Doctrine?": The Role and Status of American Law in The Hague Judgments
Convention Project, 61 Alb. L. Rev. (1998) 1283; Black, Commodifying Justice for Global Free
Trade: The Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. (2000) 237; Traynor,8
The  idea  of  a  New  Law  Merchant,  i.e.  a  transnational  commercial  law  as
described  above,  is  related  to  international  commercial  arbitration  insofar  as
domestic courts as a general principle of private international law are not allowed to
apply  non-national  law,
39  while  the  1985  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on  International
Commercial Arbitration, which was incorporated into many national arbitration laws,
provides that the arbitrators shall apply the “rules of law” the parties have chosen.
40 It
is  generally  accepted  that  the  parties  to  an  arbitration  agreement  may  choose
general  principles  of  law,  the  UNIDROIT  Principles  of  International  Commercial
Contracts, or the Lando Principles of European Contract Law, as applicable law.
41
For this reason, the only practical evidence of an evolving New Law [194] Merchant
can  be  found  in  arbitral  awards,  which  refer  to  lex  mercatoria  or  at  least  apply
transnational rules and general principles of law.
42
However, the mere fact that there are some general principles of law applied as
“rules of law” in international commercial arbitration does not necessarily indicate that
there is a lex mercatoria qualifying as an autonomous legal system.
43 The traditional
approach in jurisprudence refers to a legal system as a body of norms. Consequently
the first 25 years of the debate over a “New Law Merchant” was dedicated to the
question of which norms (if any) are part of or form this lex mercatoria and where
these norms stem from.
44 On this level of norms there are, generally speaking, two
ways of giving an answer:
(1)  First of all, a reach for the stars, to abstract natural law: general principles of
law, human rights, the decalog, the common core of legal systems and the
like. Obviously the UNIDROIT and Lando Principles belong to this category.
                                                                                                                                                        
An Introductory Framework for Analyzing the Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: U.S. And European Perspectives, 6 Ann.
Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. (2000) 1.
39  E.g. Art. 3 of the Rome Convention, see Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation. Zu
Anwendung  und  Geltung  allgemeiner  Vertragsprinzipien,  62  RabelsZ  (1998),  580-626;
Grundmann, General Principles of Private Law and Ius Commune Modernum as Applicable Law?,
Festschrift für Buxbaum, 2000, 213-234.
40  Art. 28 para. 1 of the Model Law, which is available at (http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm).
41  Berger (supra note 6) at 78 et seq., 143 et seq. (on the UNIDROIT Principles), 194 et seq. (on the
Lando Principles), both Principles are reprinted in the annexes (312 et seq.); for the UNIDROIT
Principles see also Bonell (supra note 7) at 25 et seq.; for the Lando Principles see Lando, Salient
Features of the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparison with the UCC, 13 Pace Int'l
L.  Rev.  (2001)  339 ;  Blasé,  Die  Grundregeln  des  Europäischen  Vertragsrechts  als  Recht
grenzüberschreitender  Verträge,  Münster  (quadis)  2002;  see  as  well  DiMatteo,  Contract  Talk:
Reviewing the Historical and Practical Significance of the Principles of European Contract Law, 43
Harv. Int'l L.J. (2002) 569 ; and the critique to the « liberal internationalism » at Wai, Transnational
Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of
Globalization, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. (2002) 209.
42  See Berger (supra note 9) with a lot of examples; Derains, Transnational Law in ICC Arbitration,
in: Berger (ed.) (supra note 7) 43-51; for empirical evidence see Berger et. al., The CENTRAL
Enquiry on the Use of Transnational Law in International Contract Law and Arbitration, in: Berger
(ed.) (supra note 7) at 91-113, and Annexes I-III, at 133-224, and Annex IV with examples of
choice of law clauses in international contracts, refering to general principles of law, at 227-228.
43  See the overview on the debate in Berger (supra note 6) at 89 et seq.; Gaillard, Transnational
Law: a Legal System or a Method of Decision-Making?, in: Berger (ed.) (supra note 7) 53-65.
44  Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, Arbitration International 1988, 86.9
(2)  Alternatively a step into the muds of facticity, i.e. concrete natural law: the
essence  or  nature  of  things,  custom,  living  law,  etc.  Here  we  find
standardised contract terms, trade customs and the like.
The problem with these approaches is that they instantly provoke some standard
positivist objections regarding (a) the definition of a validity test for such norms (i.e.
Hart’s rule of recognition), (b) the legitimacy of law-making, (c) the completeness of a
system  of  norms,  and  (d)  the  enforcement  of  these  norms.
45  [195]  Whereas  the
enforcement problem can easily be overcome within the framework of arbitration by
reference  to  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on  International  Commercial  Arbitration,
respective national arbitration laws, and the 1958 New York Convention
46, the issues
of validity, legitimacy and completeness result in a vicious circle of theoretical strange
loops and tautologies.
47 It is for this reason that the New Law Merchant during the
last  decades  developed  mainly  in  practice  under  the  auspices  of  “Cartesian
pragmatism”, as Klaus Peter Berger has so aptly put it.
48
Now what are the possible contributions of the reflexive law approach? First of
all,  Systems  Theory  is  obviously  a  useful  analytical  tool  in  the  debate  on
transnational law, since it claims that law and politics in general are two separate and
independent social systems.
49 The intertwining of law and politics in the constitutional
nation state in this perspective is rather a very modern and special case in social
evolution.  A  “Global  Law  without  a  State”  is  thus  a  phenomenon  which  Systems
Theory is readily prepared to conceptualise.
50
However, more important are the differences which result from the shift of the
theoretical focus from the level of norms to the level of communication.
51 Suddenly
things are very easy, for all law is positive law, i.e. is valid by decision only.
52 To form
a legal system one basically needs three communications, each raising a normative
claim for validity (i.e. prescriptive speech acts): (1) a claimant (ego), (2) a defendant
(alter), and (3) a court (alter ego, generalised other).
53 These communicative acts
                                                
45  For a discussion of the objections against the Lex Mercatoria-Doctrine see Berger (supra note 6)
ch.  2,  p.  44-110;  see  as  well  Grundmann  (supra  note  39);  Schroeder,  Die  lex  mercatoria  –
Rechtsordnungsqualität und demokratische Legitimation, in: Witt et al. (Hrsg.), Die Privatisierung
des Privatrechts, Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 2002, Stuttgart (forthcoming).
46  See Berger (supra note 35) and Nienaber (supra note 38).
47  See e.g. Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8
European Law Journal  (2002) 400-432.
48  Berger (supra note 9) at 3; for a very rich study on the development of lex mercatoria in the
practice of international commercial arbitration, based on empirical research see Dezelay/Garth,
Dealing in Virtue, Chicago UP 1996.
49  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, ch. 9.
50  See Teubner (supra note 13); G. Calliess (supra note 149).
51  See for the following Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, especially ch. 2., ; Teubner (supra
note 24) ch. 3.
52  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 280.
53  See G. Calliess, Das Tetralemma des Rechts, ZfRSoz 2000, 293, 304 et seq. The term „court“
does  not  necessarily  signify  a  “states  court”,  but  includes  functional  equivalents.  However,  a
single decision (see Albert, Legalisation or Global Law Formation? On the Evolution of Law in
World Society, presentation at the CENTRAL Conference on “Transnational Business in the Age
of Globalization” Münster, October 2001; see as well Albert supra note 1) will not suffice, even not
if it is a decision of an independent third party (for the fundamental role of the ”third party” see von
Trotha, Was ist Recht? Von der gewalttätigen Selbsthilfe zur staatlichen Rechtsordnung, ZfRSoz
2000, 327 ff.; on the central role of the courts in systems theory see as well Vesting, Kein Anfang
und kein Ende, JURA 2001, 299, 303). A legal system will need some kind of institutionalized10
constitute a legal system by using the code legal/illegal (lawful/unlawful). There is no
need for norms, at least not for a complete set of rules. Norms will just come [196]
naturally with the decisions, i.e. as the ratio decidendi of adjudication. Norms as the
structure of a legal system are thus produced by communication, as a by-product of
processing legal acts. However, a single judgment might not be sufficient to produce
a norm, for norms are abstract. They are generalisations of several judgments, and
they are more stable than a single case decision.
Here it comes back to autopoiesis, which we defined as the mutual and perpetual
referencing of different legal communications. The generation of norms is subject to
the logics of remembering and forgetting, i.e. the selectivity of the communication
process, by which some communicative offers for connection are accepted through
reference  by  subsequent  communications  and  others  simply  fall  into  oblivion.
54
Norms  thus  are  condensed  and  confirmed  in  the  enduring  process  of  legal
discourse.
55  To  give  an  example,  on  the  one  hand  there  are  judgments  which
somehow become “leading cases” or even passages from textbooks, quoted over
and over again, while on the other hand there might be formal positive statutes which
are not applied over a period of 25 years. Which norm is more valid, the latter or the
former? For a lawyer from a Common Law background the answer might not be too
puzzling.
As a result, it can be said that all that is required for lex mercatoria to become a
legal  system  is  a  court  that  adjudicates  it,  and  –  even  more  important  –  a  large
collection of disputes offered by the international commercial community for decision
under  the  code  of  law  merchant  (i.e.  by  referencing  in  choice  of  law  clauses  of
international commercial contracts). Lex mercatoria as a system of norms will then
flourish  quasi  automatically  (or  autopoietically)  by  means  of  condensation  and
confirmation.
IV. Transnational Law in Action 1: Lex Mercatoria
Now what are the features of the New Law Merchant, which from a reflexive-law
perspective  should  be  highlighted  as  crucial  in  its  development  towards  an
autonomous legal system? To start with the courts, since they form the centre of a
legal  system:
56  Where  precisely  do  we  find  the  courts  deciding  on  and  thereby
condensing and confirming the rules of a New Law Merchant? The national court
systems are not allowed to apply non-state law. Only arbitral tribunals under certain
arbitration  laws  may  do  so,  if  the  parties have  chosen  to  subject their  dispute  to
general  principles  of  law  and  the  like.  The  problem  with  arbitration  is  a  lack  of
continuity  and  publicity,  which  hinders  or  even  prevents  the  autopoiesis  of  lex
mercatoria.  To  give  an  example,  take  a  quote  of  Thayer  on  the  Ancient  Law
Merchant:
                                                                                                                                                        
decision making process, providing for “enduring communication” (i.e. autopoiesis) as described
below.
54  “Structures come into reality only, by being used for the interconnection of communicative events;
norms only, by being, implicitly or explicitly, quoted; … Therefore, an enormous and primary ability
of adaptation of a system lies simply in forgetting …: Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 46
(translation by the author).
55  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 127 (“logics of condensation and confirmation”).
56  Luhmann, das Recht der Gesellschaft, ch. 7.11
[197] “The voices of the consuls of the sea in Genoa and Barcelona found a ready
echo in the maritime tribunals of Bristol and Ipswich, where the court sat on the beach
and dispensed justice to passing mariners between tide and tide.”
57
Here  we  see  a  court  as  a  physically  localised  institution,  offering  its  dispute
resolution services. It sits on the beach, close to demand at the dispute-market, thus
providing  easy  and  quick  “access  to  justice”.  The  Ancient  Law  Merchant  was
developed in 12
th century Europe by commercial courts, which as a general rule were
institutionalised  very  close  to  the  dispute-markets,  e.g.  as  “consulate”  or  “staple”
courts at municipal markets and trade fairs, or as “admiralty” courts at the seaports,
and  which  decided  very  quickly  (“piepowder  courts”  or  “from  tide  to  tide”).
58  But
dispute resolution is only a service provided, not an end in itself. A legal system has
the  function  of  producing  certainty  in  normative  expectations  for  a  community
subjected to its jurisdiction.
59 For “Certainty is so essential, that law cannot even be
just  without  it”,  as  Francis  Bacon  observed.
60  Or  in  terms  of  New  Institutional
Economics, law is all about reducing transaction costs.
61 However, norms and thus
certainty can only be generated if the legal system provides for self-reference, thus
starting  the  process  of  condensation  and  confirmation  of  norms  according  to  the
logics of remembering and forgetting.
One  possible  feature  of  a  legal  system,  enabling  autopoiesis,  is  a  locally
institutionalised court, which develops a kind of collective or institutional memory.
62
Under the very basic rule of formal justice, i.e. treating alike cases alike, the court on
the beach mentioned by Thayer will start its own legal history and decide recurring
disputes by reference to its own precedents (stare decisis).
63 Thus, over time there
will evolve a body of norms making up “the law of the land” within the jurisdiction
[198] of the court. Even within elaborated national legal systems like German law
there can be found some relics of such “law of the land”, i.e. where federal legislation
is applied by district courts without any further stages of appeal.
64 It follows that a
local court is the smallest autopoietic legal system one could think of.
65
                                                
57  Thayer, Brooklyn Law Review, 1936, 139, 141; quoted by Berger (supra note 9) at 4.
58  See Berman, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 1983; German:
Recht und Revolution, 1991, at 546 et seq.
59  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, ch. 3. If the notion of a „legal system“ implies a minimum
duration over time (stableness), it follows that there cannot exist any legal system which fails to
fulfil its societal function, i.e. “no law without legal certainty”.
60  Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientarum, engl. translation, Works V (edited by J.
Speddings et al.), London 1869, 8th Book, Titel I, Aphorism 8.
61  See  generally Richter/Furubotn, Neue Institutionenökonomik, 2nd  ed.,  Tübingen  1999,  at  9  et
seq.;  for  international  commerce  see  Schmidtchen/Schmidt-Trenz,  The  Division  of  Labour  is
limited by the extent of the Law, 1 Constitutional Political Economy (1990), 1-22; Streit/Mangels,
Privatautonomes  Recht  und  grenzüberschreitende  Transaktionen,  47  ORDO  (1996),  73-100;
Schmidtchen, Lex Mercatoria und die Evolution des Rechts, in: Ott/Schäfer (ed.) (supra note 37)
1-31;  for  an  transaction  cost  approach  to  international  E-Commerce  see  Calliess,
Rechtssicherheit  und  Gerechtigkeit  im  elektronischen  Welthandel,  in:  Donges/Mai  (Hrsg.),  E-
Commerce und Wirtschaftspolitik, Stuttgart 2001, 189 ff.
62  On the notion of a “social memory”, see Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 118 et seq.
63  For  the  role  of  formal  justice  (treating  alike  cases  alike)  and  precedent  in  autopoiesis  see
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 114.
64  Every “Landgericht” has its own “Landrecht”, indicating the specific practice of interpretation of
norms only known amongst the involved local legal professionals.
65  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 324 (with regard to the German “Amtsgericht”).12
Another feature implied in Thayer’s example is that the court at the beach sits in
public, thereby allowing its rulings to be spread via an oral tradition by the observing
mariners and finally to be echoed by other tribunals and vice versa. As a result of
such discursive interconnectivity, a transjurisdictional body of marine rules emerges,
constituting  a  decentred  legal  system  with  local  courts  as  its  subsystems.  The
importance of this communicative function of public proceedings (as opposed to the
traditional  stress  on  public  control  over  the  court)  is  highlighted  by  the  fact  that
adjudication on commercial matters in Germany since the 13
th century and for a long
time thereafter did not take place in a “court”, indicating a place enclosed by buildings
or  walls,  but  in  a  Gerichtslaube  (latin:  laubia),  i.e.  a  covered  space  with  arched
openings to three sides like an arcade, built directly next to the municipal market
place, often as the ground floor of the town hall.
66
If  we  take  a  look  at  today’s  practice  of  international  commercial  arbitration,
however, we find de-localised and non-public proceedings of ad hoc tribunals put
together  by  selection  of  the  parties  for  a  single  case.  No  self-reference,  no  self-
observation, no autopoiesis in sight? Well, as Niklas Luhmann would suggest, we
ought to search for functional equivalents to continuity and publicity.
Regarding  continuity  in  international  commercial  arbitration  we  may  find  such
functional  equivalents  in  the  different  arbitration  institutions.  Strikingly,  these
institutions quite often call themselves “courts” like the London Court of International
Arbitration or the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC. Although the latter is
not a court, since the decision of a case under the ICC Arbitration Rules remains with
the arbitral tribunal which is still put together ad hoc by the parties, it provides an
institutional framework which may be suitable for autopoiesis. Article 27 of the ICC
Rules provides that each award before signing shall be submitted in [199] draft to the
Court.
67 The Court exercises a revision with regard to the form of the award, i.e.
binding approval, and a supervision with regard to the substance, i.e. it may give
non-binding advice.
68 The mere fact of a central body auditing every award, including
those applying lex mercatoria, may imply the existence of an institutional memory as
described above.
But this memory remains private. It does not contribute to legal autopoiesis as
long as the generated rules are not published. Under Art. 27 the Court could, for
instance,  provide  precedent  to  tribunals  dealing  with  lex  mercatoria  as  a  kind  of
information  service  from  its  files.  But  there  is  no  evidence  for  a  corresponding
practice.  An  equivalent,  at  least  in  the  earlier  times  of  arbitration  dominated  by
European  academics,  was  possibly  the  fact  that  the  international  arbitration
community was organised as a kind of sophisticated club, where arbitrators knew
                                                
66  Famous  examples  are  the  Gerichtslaube  of  Freiburg  of  1278  (for  the  interesting  mixture  of
municipal and merchant law in medieval Freiburg see Berman (supra note 58) at 586, indicating
that the merchants, which founded the city, were dispensed (free) of the laws of the land and
subjected to the Law Merchant only.), the 13th century one of Berlin, which was moved in 1861 to
the  park  of  the  castle  in  Babelsberg  (a  picture  is  available  under  http://www.suedwestweb-
berlin.de/struktur/c_indiv/d01872.html),  and  the  one  in  the  old  trade  house  (“Kaufhaus”)  in
Lüneburg. The advantage of a covered space as opposed to the court on the beach or under a
tree (Gerichtslinde) was simply the court’s ability to sit despite bad weather: see Köbler, Bilder
aus der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, München 1988, at 151-156.
67  Derains (supra note 42).
68  In practice, however, the Court exercises control over the form of the awards in respect of its
enforceability only, but never gives advice on the merits of a case (I owe this information to Lord
Mustill).13
each  other  and  the  insider  knowledge  on  lex  mercatoria  could  be  handed  over
informally. However, since international arbitration became big business and U.S.-
based law firms got involved, this might not be sufficient anymore.
69
On the other hand, publicity does not necessarily mean public proceedings. The
judgments  of  the  Federal  Court  of  Justice  in  Germany  (BGH),  for  instance,  are
published  generally  in  an  anonymous form  regarding  the  parties  and  facts  of  the
case, and often as well in a short form with respect to the legal arguments, revealing
the ratio decidendi rather than any case-specific details. There is something similar
as well in international commercial arbitration, e.g. when awards are published by the
ICC and other arbitration institutions or involved arbitrators report on their decisions
in law journals.
70 But the reported material is still limited and not easily available, thus
impeding the evolution of another feature of autopoiesis, the self-observation of a
legal system through legal doctrine at universities, which play an important role in
systematizing  the  material  offered  by  adjudication,  and  in  handing  down  the
knowledge of a legal system to generations of lawyers to come.
71
Another means of promoting transparency in a legal system is the publication of
a list of rules and principles of law, often combined with the systematisation of such
rules by academics. The UNIDROIT- and Lando-Principles certainly belong in this
context  of  “codification”.  They  find  their  historical  precedents  in  the  compilations
[200]  of  law  published  by  “private”  monks  in  the  11
th  century,  the  time  when  the
Western  legal  tradition  was  founded,  as  Harold  Berman  in  his  book  on  Law  and
Revolution
72  argued,  and  when,  according  to  Luhmann,  the  autopoiesis  of  law
emerged for the first time.
73 Such private codifications mark the decisive evolutionary
move from an oral to a textual tradition of law,  which  reverses  the equilibrium  of
remembering  and  forgetting  in  the  system.
74  Despite  their  purported  non-binding
character,  these  principles  are  binding  to  the  arbitral  tribunal,  once  they  are
referenced in a choice of law clause. And suddenly there are not too few norms, but
there may be too many, so that the arbitral tribunal finds itself in a situation so well
known  to  judges,  i.e.  where  the  norm  text  has  to  be  modified  by  means  of
interpretation in order to do justice to a single case.
However, these compilations of principles are somehow too abstract, in that they
are not derived from actual adjudication but from the common core of legal systems
as perceived by some famous comparative lawyers. If norms come into reality rather
by application, a step further is the CENTRAL List
75, which combines the principles
with references to arbitral precedent in lex mercatoria, thereby somehow reflecting
the  tradition  of  the  courts  of  the  Ancient  Law  Merchant  to  publish  the  rules  and
principles as applied in their jurisdiction, e.g. the Rolls of Oléron or the “Consolato del
                                                
69  On the informal tradition of arbitral awards see Berger, The International Arbitrators’ Application of
Precedents,  9  J.Int.Arb.  1992,  at  5,  21.  For  the  sociological  aspects  of  the  development  of
international arbitration see Dezelay/Garth (supra note 48) at 100 et seq. (on U.S. Litigators and
European Academics).
70  Berger (supra note 6) at 62 et seq. listing the different publication organs and stating, that the
practice of publishing awards will soon almost equal that of domestic court judgements.
71  This last feature, being very important in German law, is not a conditio sine qua non in terms of
autopoiesis, since the English legal system does quite well without it.
72  Berman (supra note 58) at 81 et seq.
73  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 62.
74  Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 245-256.
75  Berger (supra note 6).14
mare”  of  Barcelona.
76  Moreover,  in  terms  of  providing  free  and  easy  access  to
systematic  knowledge  of  lex  mercatoria  and  thereby  enabling  self-reference,  the
CENTRAL Transnational Law Database launched on the Internet in autumn 2001
77
seems  to  be  a  further  milestone  on  the  road  to  the  New  Law  Merchant  as  an
autopoietic system.
But  all  these  lists  become  valid  law  only  by  reference  of  the  parties  to  an
international commercial contract. And here the New Law Merchant is competing with
other  national  private  law  jurisdictions.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  the  international
commercial  community  and,  even  more  important,  its  legal  advisors  have  to  be
convinced that the New Law Merchant is a competitive legal system: that it is – as
opposed to being merely a tool of alternative dispute resolution – a normative system
reducing transaction costs in global business by generating legal certainty.
78 [201]
From the reflexive law perspective, the decisive step from “Merchants of Law” (i.e.
dispute  resolution  service  providers)  to  “Moral  Entrepreneurs”  (i.e.  constructing
certainty  in  an  autonomous  legal  system)  is  all  about  communication.
79  The
underlying  constructivist  approach  implies  that  the  coming  into  existence  of  lex
mercatoria, i.e. its “impossible reality” is measurable by the number of references
made  to  it  in  legal  discourse.  In  other  words,  if  emerging  legal  certainty  in  lex
mercatoria  is  a  public  good  produced  as  a  pro-bono  side-effect  of  international
commercial arbitration,
80 then the fundamental law of charity applies: “do good, and
talk about it”.
V. Transnational Law in Action 2: Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
At this point I intend to introduce another example of a transnational legal system, the
ICANN  Domain  Name  Dispute  Resolution  Process.  The  Internet  Corporation  for
Assigned  Names  and  Numbers  (“ICANN”)  is  a  private  not-for-profit  organisation,
responsible, among other things, for the management of the domain name system,
i.e.  the  global addressing  system  of  the  Internet.  Domain  names  are  the  human-
friendly  form  of  the  numeric  Internet  Protocol  (IP)  addresses.  With  the
commercialisation of the Internet
81 they acquired significance as business identifiers
                                                
76  Berman (supra note 58) at 537, 559.
77  Available under www.tldb.de; for the comparable online database UNILEX see infra at note 123.
78  If you like, this is the democratic part of systems theory: communications submit themselves to
the  code  of  one  social  subsystem  (e.g.  law)  or  they  just  do  not  (and  then  maybe  submit
themselves to the code of another subsystem). See Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 69,
72 (regarding the choice not to refer to the legal code but to alternative dispute resolution), and
74. The same holds true for competing legal systems: choice of law is nothing else but (law)
consumer sovereignty, and an unfavourable legal system will somehow go bankrupt, if it does not
attract a sustainable amount of communications in the competition of jurisdictions. This is exactly
what happened to the “Ancient Law Merchant” when the national legal systems were  adapted to
the needs of modern commerce in 19th century Europe: see Stein (supra note 19) at 17, 27 et
passim.
79  For the lucky notion of “Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs” in the context of international
commercial arbitration see Dezelay/Garth (supra note 48) at 33 et seq.
80  In  the  context  of  norm  production  in  common  law  R.  A.  Posner  observed  “the  character  of
precedents as a by-product of the litigation process” (Economic Analysis of Law, 5th ed. 1998,
§ 20.2, at 588); see as well Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, at 306: “gleichsam mit linker
Hand”.
81  Hutter,  The  Commercialization  of  the  Internet.  A  Progress  Report,  in:  Engel/Keller  (ed.),
Understanding  the  Impact  of  Global  Networks  on  Local  Social,  Political  and  Cultural  Values,15
and, as such, have come into conflict with intellectual property rights. Domain name
disputes  arise  largely  from  the  practice  of  cybersquatting,  i.e.  the  pre-emptive
registration of trademarks by third parties as domain names. Cybersquatters exploit
the first-come, first-served nature of the domain name registration process in order to
put the domains on auction or to offer them directly for sale to the company involved
at prices far beyond the cost of registration.
On  proposal  of  the  U.S.  Government
82  the  World  Intellectual  Property
Organization  (WIPO)  in  1998  undertook  an  extensive  international  process  of
consultations  on  the  interference  of  the  domain  name  system  with  trademarks,
especially  with  a  view  to  establishing  a  quick,  efficient,  and  cost-effective  on-line
dispute  resolution  [202]  procedure  for  domain  name  disputes.
83  While  an  interim
report considered arbitration in respect of any intellectual property dispute arising out
of  a  domain  name  registration,  the  final  report  recommended  a  mandatory
administrative  procedure  limited  to  cybersquatting,  which  was  held  to  be  an
undoubted infringement of general principles of trademark law as expressed both in
international treaties and national case law, and which was universally condemned
throughout  the  consultation  process.
84  Issues  not  related  to  trademarks  were
postponed to be considered in a second consultation process, since the law with
respect to trade names, geographical indications and personality rights is less evenly
harmonised throughout the world.
85
As  a  result,  in  1999  ICANN  adopted  its  Uniform  Dispute  Resolution  Policy
(“UDRP”),
86  which  all  registration  service  providers,  accredited  by  ICANN  as
registrars for the generic Top-Level-Domains “.com”, “.org”, and “.net”, incorporated
by  reference  in  the  registration  agreements  with  their  customers,  i.e.  the  domain
name  holders.
87  According  to  the  UDRP  the  registrar  will  cancel  or  transfer  a
registered domain name to a third party (the “complainant”), if it receives an order of
an administrative panel of an ICANN-approved dispute resolution service provider to
do so, and the registered holder (the “respondent”) has not commenced a lawsuit
against the complainant challenging the panel decision within ten business days after
its  reception  by  the  registrar.  The  panel  shall  issue  an  order  of  transfer,  if  the
complainant  has  proved  each  of  the  following  three  elements:  (i)  the  contested
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and (ii) the respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests  in  respect  of  the  domain  name;  and  (iii)  the  domain  name  has  been
registered and is being used in bad faith.
88
                                                                                                                                                        
Baden-Baden 2000, 73-92.
82  See  the  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  “White  Paper”  of  5  June  1998,  available  at
(http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm).
83  Seventeen consultation meetings were held in 15 different cities throughout the world, and written
submissions were received from 334 governments, intergovernmental organizations, professional
associations, corporation and individuals. See the Report on the First WIPO Internet Domaine
Name Process, available at (http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/index.html).
84  See First WIPO Report at No. 174.
85  The Report on the Second WIPO Domain Name Process is essentially calling for a decision of the
international community on a harmonization of the respective laws as a prerequisite for a uniform
dispute resolution policy. The Report is available at (http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/).
86  Available at (http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm).
87  For the implementation process see (http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm).
88  See Paragraph 4 a of the UDRP, while circumstances giving evidence of (ii) and (iii) are outlined16
The  Rules for  UDRP  (the  “Rules”)
89  provide  for  an  expedited  procedure.  The
complaint is decided on the basis of the written statements and documents submitted
(Rule 15 a). If the respondent fails to submit his response within twenty days after
reception of the complaint, the panel decides based upon the complaint (Rules 5 a,
e, 4 c, and 14 a ). Further statements are allowed only if requested by the panel
[203] in its sole discretion (Rule 12), and in-person hearings (including hearings by
teleconference, videoconference, and web-conference) are conducted by the panel
as an exceptional matter only (Rule 13). In addition, the approved dispute service
providers in their supplementary rules may set up word limits for certain parts of the
complaint and the response, which in the case of the WIPO as the leading dispute
resolution provider under the UDRP, are five thousand words.
90
After  two  years  of  experience  with  the  UDRP  it  is  generally  said  to  be  an
overwhelming success, at least with regard to the number of cases decided and,
thus,  predominantly  for  the  holders  of  trademarks,  who  obviously  welcomed  an
efficient tool for transnational dispute resolution, instead of having to rely on highly
complex multi-jurisdictional litigation.
91 Of course, a lot of critique has been raised as
well,  e.g.  rule  of  law  and  fair  trial  issues  with  regard  to  the  very  expedited
procedure,
92  or  in  respect  of  the  competition  between  different  dispute  resolution
providers purportedly resulting in a “race” towards trademark friendly decisions,
93 or
simply as to the limited scope of the UDRP, favouring trademark rights over other
legitimate interests.
94
For the purposes of this article, however, the interesting question is if the UDRP
constitutes an autopoietic legal system, a kind of transnational trademark law. Since
there are no contracts between complainants and respondents, the administrative
procedure  first  of  all  is  not  arbitration  and,  thus,  does  not  participate  in  the
advantages of finality and enforcement under national arbitration laws and the New
[204]  York  Convention.  However,  such  a  legal  framework  is  not  necessary  for
enforcement,  since  the  panel  decisions  are  enforced  by  the  registrars,  legally  by
means of termination of the registration agreement with the respondent, and factually
                                                                                                                                                        
in paragraph 4 b and c.
89  Available at (http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm).
90  See § 10 of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center supplemental rules, wich are available at
(http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/rules/supplemental.html); in 2001 about 60 % of all cases under
the UDRP were filed with WIPO: see (http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/releases/2002/p303.htm).
91  As of January 2002 at total of 3457 gTLD-cases were filed with WIPO, of 3157 decided cases
64 % resulted in a transfer of the contested domain, 15.5 % of the complaints were denied, and
20 % of the complaints were withdrawn: see (http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/statistics/results.html).
92  Donahey, The UDRP and the Absence of the Rule of Law, 4 Journal of Internet Law (2000), at 15;
Thornburg,  Fast,  Cheap,  and  out  of  Control:  Lessons  from  the  ICANN  Dispute  Resolution
Process, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. (2002) 191.
93  This “race” is said to be the reason why E-Resolution, which was the second ICANN approved
provider after WIPO, ceased to offer the service in autumn 2001 since too little disputes were
initiated with it. See Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in
the ICANN UDRP, (http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/geistudrp.pdf); Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com?
An update on bias allegations and the ICANN UDRP, (http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/fairupdate.pdf)
94  See  Hancock,  An  Assessment  of  ICANN’s  Mandatory  Uniform  Dispute  Resolution  Policy  in
Resolving  Disputes  Over  Domain  Names,  JILT  2001  (1),  available  at
(http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-3/hancock.html);  White,  ICANN's  Uniform  Domain  Name  Dispute
Resolution Policy In Action, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. (2001) 229; Lehmkuhl (supra note 1); and the
very thorough analysis and critique at Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy".
Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. (2002) 605.17
simply by cancellation or transfer of the contested domain in the electronic registry.
Compliance of the registrars with panel decisions in turn is guaranteed by virtue of
ICANN’s  monopoly  on  the  accreditation  of  registrars  for  the  generic  top-level
domains.
95
With regard to finality, the fact that the panel decisions are not binding to national
courts does not mean that the administrative procedure is not a legal one. First of all,
national court rulings share this  non-finality  in  that they  are final  and  enforceable
within  the  limits  of  their  jurisdiction  only.
96  Secondly,  the  vast  majority  of  panel
decisions  is  never  contested  in  national  courts,  perhaps  because  cybersquatters
consider their chances for redress to be very low.
97 And finally, the legitimacy of the
administrative procedure as a whole is based on its non-finality, since the argument
of deliberate consent of the respondents to their subjection to the procedure under
the  registration  agreements  does  not  prevail  due  to  the  fact,  that  the  UDRP  is
unilaterally  imposed  on  the  domain  name  holders  again  by  virtue  of  ICANN’s
monopoly power.
98
[205] The administrative procedure is an adversarial court-like procedure, where
the panel as an independent third party decides the case in accordance with the
Policy, the Rules and any rules and principles of law that the panel deems applicable
(Rule 15 a). However small the scope of the procedure may be, in that it essentially
applies only one single substantive norm, i.e. the UDRP definition of cybersquatting,
in practice highly complex questions are involved such as the extent to which non-
registered common law trademarks may constitute rights of complainants, especially
in  the  case  of  governmental  organisations,
99  famous  personal  names,
100  city
                                                
95  On  the  competitive  implications  of  the  unilateral  imposition  of  the  UDRP  by  ICANN  on  the
registrars see A. Michael Froomkin and Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, TPRC Conference
Draft 2001, available at (http://arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/0109/0109075.pdf), p. 46 et seq.
96  On the pending Hague Convention see supra note 38.
97  A  list  of  appealed  UDRP  cases  is  available  at  (http://www.udrplaw.net/UDRPappeals.htm).
However, Froomkin (supra note 94) suggests, that time limits for respondents to bring a claim to a
states court are simply too short.
98  See supra (note 95). The ICANN equivalent DENIC, administering the German country code top-
level-domain “.de”, was held to be at least market dominant under section 20 of the German Anti
Trust Code (GWB): see OLG Frankfurt, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis (WRP) 2000, at 214 f.
Since the UDRP is enclosed into the general business terms of the registrars by means of a
dynamic reference only, it is to be doubted that a valid arbitration clause under art. 2 of the New
York Convention, or section 1031 ZPO respectively, could be constituted thereby. Furthermore,
with regard to respondents which hold a domain name as consumers, such arbitration clause
might be held void either under section 1031 para.  5 ZPO (requiring for consumer arbitration
clauses  the  form  of  a  separate  agreement  with  a  personal  or  electronic  signature)  or  under
section 307 BGB, which implements the European Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/ECC, if
the panel decisions were meant to be final without the option of an appeal to domestic courts. The
Annex to Art. 3 Para. 3 of the Directive, giving examples of unfair terms, in No. 1 q) states, that
clauses which limit or exclude the consumers right to litigate (which is guaranteed under Art. 6 of
the European Human Rights Convention), especially by directing him exclusively to an alternative
dispute resolution system which does not qualify as arbitration under the arbitration  laws, are
unfair, which might be true as well in case of commercial domain holders.
99  See WIPO Case No. D2001-1401, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) v.
RJG Engineering Inc., stating that “Bundesinnenministerium” is a common law trademark.
100 See e.g. WIPO Case No. D2000-0210: Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, which was appealed
without success; see generally Falzone, Playing the Hollywood Name Game in Cybercourt: The
Battle  over  Domain  Names  in  the  Age  Of  Celebrity-Squatting,  21  Loyola  of  Los  Angeles
Entertainment Law Review (2001), at 289; Isaac, Personal Names and the UDRP: A Warning to
Authors and Celebrities, 12 Entertainment Law Review (2001).18
names,
101  athletic  organisations,
102  and  other  organisations  which  usually  do  not
register trademarks; how a conflict of competing trademarks registered in different
jurisdictions is to be solved;
103 if parody web-sites should be allowed or not
104, etc.
In  terms  of  legal  autopoiesis,  the  fact  that  according  to  Paragraph  4  j  of  the
UDRP all panel decisions are published in full over the Internet
105 is of paramount
importance. The system allows for quick and easy access to prior panel decisions
and, although not binding as precedent, it has become commonplace for parties and
panelists in later proceedings to cite prior UDRP decisions as if they carried some
precedential value.
106 As a consequence, very soon after the initiation of the process
there  emerged  a  set  of  leading  cases,  determining  the  further  evolution  of  the
system, [206] while most panel decisions simply fell into oblivion.
107 The selectivity of
remembrance in the evolutionary process of condensation and confirmation of norms
is thus the central feature, by which the system is enabled to cope with the above
mentioned  complexity  of  the  involved  substantive  questions.  However,  such
evolutionary  development  cannot  prevent  contradictory  decisions  and  the
introduction of an appellate panel was already proposed.
108
VI. Reflexive Transnational Law
In  this  final  part  I  shall  draw  some  conclusions  from  the  comparison  of  both  lex
mercatoria and the UDRP as transnational legal systems, leading to the proposition
of the following two theses with regard to a general theory of a reflexive transnational
law in world society:
Within  the  general  framework  of  globalisation  there  can  be  observed  a  trend
towards the privatisation of civil law, established by the emergence of functionally
specialised transnational legal systems. From a reflexive law perspective the decisive
step of a transnational private regime from a social norm arrangement providing a
form of alternative dispute resolution to a transnational legal system producing legal
                                                
101 WIPO Case. No. D2001-0047: Brisbane City Council v. Warren Bolton Consulting Pty Ltd.
102 Jones,  Protecting  your  "SportsEvents.com":  Athletic  Organizations  and  the  Uniform  Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 5 West Virginia J. Law & Tech., No. 2, 2001.
103 See Hancock (supra note 94), at 20 et seq.; King, The "Law That It Deems Applicable": ICANN,
Dispute  Resolution  and  the  Problem  of  Cybersquatting,  22  Hastings  Communications  and
Entertainment Law Journal (2000), at 453.
104 Katz/Carnahan, Battling the “CompanyNameSucks.com” cyberactivists, 13 Intellectual Property &
Technology Law Journal (2001), at 1-7.
105 WIPO cases are available at (http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/index.html); The web site
Domain Name Law Reports (www.dnlr.com) allows users to search through UDRP decisions of all
dispute resolution service providers; The page (www.udrplaw.net) provides systematized access
and commentary.
106 Levy, Precedent and Other Problems with ICANN's UDRP Procedure, The Domain Name Law
Reporter, 2001 (http://dnlr.com/reporter/levyicann.shtml); Hancock (supra note 94) at 21. WIPO
panel decisions even use hyperlinks.
107 Bettinger, Online-Schiedsgerichte für Domainnamensstreitigkeiten: Eine Bestandsaufnahme der
ersten 1000 Entscheidungen, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 2000, at 1109-1116.
108 Donahey, A Proposal for an Appellate Panel for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, 18 Journal of International Arbitration (2001), 131-134; Helfer/ Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Donaim Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 William
and Mary Law Review (2001), 141-273, at 250 et seq.19
certainty is all about self-referential communication, i.e. the autopoietic reproduction
of a communication system.
In  the  context  of  global  governance  such  transnational  legal  systems  may
contribute  substantially  to  the  common  good,  provided  they  are  embedded  in  the
procedural framework of a civil constitution, enabling self-regulation and at the same
time  promoting  the  reflection  of  public  and  third  party  interests.  The  necessary
civilisation  of  private  law  takes  place  in  a  dual  process  of  constitutionalisation:
internally  the  self-organisation  of  global  private  regimes  is  accompanied  by  the
phenomenon of hierarchical self-binding, leading to the emergence of a spontaneous
constitution, and externally control is exercised in a heterarchical multilevel system of
mainly  procedural  public  international  law  frameworks,  more  or  less  co-ordinated
national legislation, and multi-jurisdictional court supervision.
109
[207] 1. The Privatisation of Civil Law
What  is  striking  when  comparing  the  above  discussed  examples  of  transnational
private regimes in terms of legal autopoiesis, is the fact that the two years of practice
with  the  UDRP,  as  compared  with  the  four  decades  of  evolution  in  New  Law
Merchant,  has  led  to  a  resounding  amount  of  certainty  and  complexity  within  the
system. So why that success? First of all, the UDRP is made for the Internet and
uses  the  tools  of  modern  communication,  thereby  not  only  enabling,  but  rather
actively promoting self-reference. Unprecedented in legal history, the existence of the
transnational trademark law is entirely virtual in that all elements of the system are
processed on-line, from the quasi-legislative Policy and Rules, over the contractual
foundations  in  the  registration  agreements  and  the  adjudicative  part  of  the  panel
decisions, to self-observation by legal writers in on-line journals and special web-
sites. The transaction costs of getting involved with the system are exceptionally low,
and hence, access to justice, very easy. Secondly, the UDRP was rationally planned
and constructed as a highly formalised system from the outset. By virtue of ICANN’s
monopoly power it could be implemented unilaterally as a mandatory procedure.
The  dilemma  of  lex  mercatoria,  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  its  coming  into
existence is dependant on contract parties’ choice of law, which in turn is dependant
first of all on lex mercatoria being (at least perceived as) existent. This vicious circle
of “the better it works, the better it works”, which in terms of evolution made the initial
start-off quite unlikely, could be overcome only by literally “talking it into existence”
counterfactually.
110 Lex mercatoria is a kind of legal parasite, which developed by
piggy-backing on international commercial arbitration. Successful as it might have
been, I hope to have shown that the prerequisites of legal autopoiesis (institutional
memory, publicity), implied in the drive of such a parasite towards an autonomous
                                                
109 For the idea of a dual constitution see Teubner, Global private regimes (supra note 11).
110 This being the reason, why – at least in the earlier times quite rightly – lex mercatoria was seen as
a kind of legal Loch Ness monster – occasionally in the headlines as a result of a purported
sighting but ultimately non-existent (see Molineaux, Journal of International Arbitration 2000, at
147), or as a “Myth” (see Delaume, The Myth of the Lex  Mercatoria and  State Contracts, in:
Carbonneau  (ed.),  Lex  Mercatoria  and  Arbitration,  Rev.  Ed.,  Kluwer  1998,  111).  For  a  funny
evidence  of  “counterfactually  talking  into  existence”  see  Lowenfeld,  Lex  Mercatoria:  An
Arbitrator’s View, in: Carbonneau (ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, 71-91, at 83: “Perhaps ...
the three arbitrators, like hundreds of international arbitrators before them, did not realize that they
were applying lex mercatoria.”20
legal  system,  somehow  tend  to  establish  a  tension  with  respect  to  the  inherent
virtues  of  arbitration  (informal,  non-public).
111  For  the  further  development  of  lex
mercatoria towards legal certainty it might be a good idea, for instance, to establish a
World  Commercial  Court  (WCC)  as  a  private  (you  and  me),  hybrid  (ICC)  or
international public (UN) institution, which would undertake revisions with regard to
the law, but not to the facts of arbitral awards applying lex mercatoria. The delay
involved with a stage of appeal would, however, be contrary to the intent [208] of
arbitration, i.e. to provide for quick and efficient dispute resolution – which is true as
well for the UDRP.
As a result it can be said that both in transnational commercial and trademark law
there can be observed the phenomenon of legal autopoiesis. In terms of the further
development of such autonomous legal systems it is important not to transplant the
formal  institutions  known  to  us  from  traditional  national  legal  systems  without
reflecting on the distinct function these systems fulfill in global business as service
providers, which is predominantly the efficient resolution of transnational disputes.
Any measure intended to promote the emergence of legal certainty, thus, should not
contravene the competitive advantage of transnational law  over  multi-jurisdictional
court litigation. The concept of transnational law, therefore, has to pay attention to
functional equivalents to traditional legal institutional arrangements.
2. The Civilisation of Private Law
The  focus  of  this  article  has  been  mainly  on  the  third  notion  implied  in  the  term
reflexive law, i.e. self-reference or autopoiesis. I conclude with some remarks on the
first and second meaning of reflexive law, i.e. reflexivity and reflexion.
112 Reflexive
law is not a mere reflection of the practice of transnational commerce, as if it would
only mirror societal usage and norms, which was the case, for instance, with the
famous  Sachsenspiegel,  a  private  compilation  of  medieval  customary  law.
113
Reflexive  law  strives  towards  much  more  ambitious  goals  in  that  it  enables  and
promotes  societal  self-regulation  by  providing  for  the  necessary  public  legal
framework for private ordering, for instance in the national arbitration laws and the
1958 New York Convention. At the same time this framework fulfills the function of a
“constitution  of  freedom”  as  intended  by  ordo-liberalism  and  new  constitutional
economics,
114 and [209] that is not only enabling but also setting up the limits of self-
                                                
111 See for this tension Berger (supra note 6) at 62.
112 See supra II. It has to be stressed that the intent of this article was mainly to demonstrate the
possible  contributions  of  the  reflexive-law  approach  to  the  question,  if  the  phenomenon  of
transnational law could and should be conceptualized as an autonomous legal system beyond the
nation state, i.e. hard law rather than soft law. The positive answer to this question does not
indicate, that the autonomous legal systems we can find on the transnational plane are praised as
the perfect solution to our problems. To the contrary, the here promoted perception of private
regimes as emergent hard law seems to be a prerequisite for asking the right questions  with
regard to the necessary constitutionalization of such regimes.
113 “>Mirror of the Saxons< this book shall be titled, since with it the law of the Saxons will become
generally known, like the women see their faces in a mirror” (transl. gpc): Eike von Repgow, Der
Sachsenspiegel, (about 1230), edited by Schott, 3rd ed., Zürich 1996, Vorrede in Reimpaaren.
114 Kerber/Vanberg, Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits – The Perspective of
Constitutional Economics, in: Grundmann/Kerber/Weatherill (ed.), Party Autonomy and the Role
of Information in the Internal Market, Berlin/New York 2001, at 49-79.21
regulation and trying to modulate the regulated discourse towards a reflection of third
party interests and of common or public good.
115
Thus, the national arbitration laws and the New York Convention not only provide
for the international enforceability of arbitral awards, but at the same time subject
such public recognition of private justice to certain rule-of-law conditions concerning
deliberate consent to arbitration and fair trial. In the case of the UDRP such a public
law  framework  may  be  found  in  the  option  of  an  appeal  to  a  court  of  mutual
jurisdiction.
116 Here it comes to regulation of self-regulation, i.e. the reflexive context
of  private  justice.  Several  U.S.  District  Courts  decided  not  to  be  bound  by  the
outcome of the ICANN administrative proceedings and to give no deference to the
panel decisions.
117 This, however, does not imply, that the UDRP is ignored or set
aside as irrelevant by the courts. On the one hand the non binding character of panel
decisions as opposed to arbitral awards is absolutely within the intent of the UDRP.
On the other hand in deciding on the merits of the case the courts pay due attention
to  the  arguments  delivered  by  the  panels.
118  As  Robert  Alexy  observed  for  the
German  legal  system,  it  is  exactly  the  non  binding  status  of  precedent,  which
somehow  counterintuitively  highlights  the  importance  of  deliberation  and  reason
giving,  i.e.  discursive  rationality  in  adjudication.
119  Strikingly,  the  WIPO  panel
decisions are very thoroughly drafted, especially in hard cases. In providing good
reasons [210] the panel decisions express the intent, to satisfy not only the parties
(procedural justice), but eventually a court of appeal (persuasive precedent).
Reflexive  law,  however,  is  a  very  indirect  method  of  regulation.  To  give  an
example, no-one is permitted from performing “private” arbitration outside the public
law framework of the national arbitration laws and the New York Convention, as it is
the case with the UDRP. Reflexive law promotes the application of minimum rule-of-
law standards in alternative dispute resolution by means of incentives rather than
command and control. It sets up a framework for finality and public enforceability,
which is perceived by the international arbitration community as an “offer that cannot
be  refused”.  Institutional  experiments  and  social  norm  arrangements  are  not
excluded, but the majority of cases is absorbed by the established suction towards
the public law framework. Reflexive regulation thus is not only open to innovation, but
                                                
115 For the constitutional elements in reflexive law see Teubner (supra note 11), for similar ideas of a
public  law  framework  for  international  private  ordering  see  Perrit  (supra  note  18),  and  in  the
perspective of New Institutional Economics Brousseau, Internet Regulation: Does Self-Regulation
Require  an  Institutional  Framework?  Paper  presented  at  the  5th  Annual  Conference  of  the
International  Society  for  New  Institutional  Economics,  September  13-15,  2001,  Berkeley,
California (http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE01/Papers01/brousseau.pdf).
116 On the relation of non-national and national systems see the analysis of Helfer/ Dinwoodie (supra
note 108), at 252 et seq.;  and the critique at Froomkin (supra note 94); for the role of courts in the
supervision of self-regulation see generally Wiethölter, Zum Fortbildungsrecht der richterlichen
Rechtsfortbildung, KritV 1988, 1-28.
117 See e.g. the appeal to WIPO Case No. D2000-0505: Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v.
Barcelona.com Inc. On February 22, 2002, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia rendered a decision upholding the WIPO decision. The Court’s ruling is available at
(http://www.udrplaw.net/Barcelona.pdf), see on deference at page 4-5 with further references; for
an  overview  see  Sorkin,  Judicial  Review  of  ICANN  Domain  Name  Dispute  Decisions,  18
Computer & High Tech. L.J. (2001) 35.
118 See the Ruling (supra note 117), at 5 et seq., where the Court cites the First WIPO Report for the
non-binding character, but in the following reasoning on the merits of the case is heavily quoting
and drawing on the argumentation of the panel decision, which is upheld as a result.
119 See Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, Frankfurt/Main 1983.22
at the same time very effective in terms of enforcement. There is no need for public
administrative surveillance with regard to the minimum rule-of-law standards since
the arbitration community has a self-interest in compliance. The fact that the ICC
International  Court of  Arbitration  is  reviewing  every  single  award  in  respect  of  its
enforceability under the New York Convention and has to give binding approval with
regard to its form is a good example for the resulting self-enforcing arrangements.
However,  the  reflexive  law  framework  as  a  procedural  constitution
120  of
transnational commercial law could go beyond the tools used up to now. In terms of
promoting legal certainty rather than enabling arbitration as a means of alternative
dispute resolution only, the erection of a World Commercial Court (WCC) could be
part  of  such  a  constitution  of  international  commerce.  It  should  be  kept  in  mind,
however, that regulatory competition shall not be excluded thereby, and at the same
time such a constitution of lex mercatoria should not interfere with the original ratio of
arbitration. A WCC, thus, could be designed as a non-binding offer to international
commerce,  for  example  by  providing  a  model  choice  of  law  (lex  mercatoria)  and
arbitration clause with or without the option of an appeal to a WCC.
121 If there is
actual demand for legal certainty in global business, such a clause should prevail in
the competition of jurisdictions. A WCC should, however, be institutionalised as a
multilateral  hybrid  institution  like  ICANN  or  the  WIPO  Arbitration  Center,  thus
providing for the necessary trust in expertise and independence. Taking the ICANN
approach of accrediting selected dispute resolution service providers as an example,
it might as well be an option for hybrid norm formulating agencies like UNIDROIT,
[211] to accredit certain arbitral institutions or an appellate body with the authoritative
interpretation and the generation of precedent with regard to the Principles.
The problem with UNIDROIT in this respect is that it is financially ill-equipped and
its representatives feel unable to perform additional functions as e.g. the publication
of  arbitral  awards  or  the  like,  since  such  “subsidiary  activities”  are  “subject  to
extrabudgetary  funding”.
122  Blueprinting  the  above  mentioned  CENTRAL
Transnational  Law  Database,  which  includes  reference  to  arbitral  awards  into  an
open list of principles of lex mercatoria, the Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law
Studies – a joint venture of the Italian National Research Council, the University of
Rome I “La Sapienza”, and UNIDROIT – recently established the online-database
UNILEX,  providing  case  law  and  bibliography  on  the  CISG  and  the  UNIDROIT
Principles.
123 The project was financed by the Italian National Research Council and
the Milan National and International Arbitration Chamber. Since it is the international
business  community,  which  benefits  from  the  transparency  and  legal  certainty
produced by this project, the question remains, however, why UNIDROIT does not
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follow the example of WIPO, which unlike other specialized agencies of the United
Nations is mostly self-financed and generated about 90 percent of its income in 2001
from  international  registration,  database,  dispute  resolution  and  other  services  it
provides to the private sector.
124 The WIPO Arbitration Center is, for example, the
market dominant dispute resolution service provider accredited by ICANN under the
UDRP.
125 Moreover, such approach would not necessarily imply that UNIDROIT itself
provides such services. Additional funds could be generated simply by accrediting or
licensing third party use of the Principles.
A problem with the mentioned online databases is, that they somehow have to
get hold of the arbitral awards to be published and that the online reproduction of
awards  already  published  otherwise  is  subject  to  permission  by  the  holders  of
copyrights.
126  In  this  context  it  seems  to  be  somehow  unjustified,  that  parties  to
international contracts and their arbitrators on the one hand make free use of the
Principles provided by UNIDROIT, but on the other hand do not provide UNIDROIT
with  sufficient  feedback  and,  in  addition,  that  arbitrators  or  arbitral  institutions  do
[212]  even  profit  from  copyrights  on  awards,  which  draw  on  these  Principles.  A
solution to this problem,  which  could  eventually  even  contribute  to  the funding  of
UNIDROIT, might be to amend the preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles (or Art.
1:101 of the Principles of European Contract Law respectively) as follows:
These Principles are subject to copyright protection. Parties to international contracts
and  arbitrators  are  licensed  to  make  use  of  these  Principles  under  the  following
condition:  In  expressly  submitting  a  contract  to  these  Principles  the  parties  of  the
contract agree and irrevocably instruct the arbitral tribunal to provide UNIDROIT with a
– where necessary in terms of business secrets etc. black-lined – copy of the arbitral
award applying such Principles for confidential use by UNIDROIT in commenting on or
amending  the  Principles  and/or  for  the  de-personalized  publication  of  the  ratio
decidendi of such award.
Of course this is a preliminary idea, which would need further reflection. It is intended
to illustrate that there are “private taxation” solutions to the problem of the funding (in
terms of information and feedback, but potentially as well money) of norm formulating
and other agencies, which contribute to legal certainty in the conduct of transnational
business.
Enabling  transnational  legal  systems  is,  however,  only  one  aspect  of  the
procedural constitution. The other aspect is concerned with the necessary limits to
self-regulation in terms of public policies, e.g. „distributive justice, democratic political
governance,  or  effective  transnational  regulation“.
127  In  both  examples  of
transnational law discussed in this article, the issue of the civilisation of private law
might not seem to be very pressing. For the law of international commerce on the
one hand is traditionally a field where  little  policy  is  involved.  The  idea  of  a  self-
regulation of commerce is a very old one and we have the feeling that there is no
need  for  extensive  regulation,  since  the  merchants  are  considered  to  be  able  to
protect themselves. The UDRP on the other hand does not  directly  interfere  with
                                                
124 See www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/.
125 Froomkin (supra note 94) at 231.
126 On the  UNILEX Website, for example, the following  language  is contained: “The International
Chamber  of  Commerce  International  Court  of  Arbitration  has  kindly  granted  permission  to
reproduce extracts from arbitral awards published in the ICC International  Court  of Arbitration
Bulletin”.
127 See Wai (supra note 41) at 211, 231 et passim.24
state regulation. Since the results of the administrative proceedings are not binding,
the  system  can  be  regarded  as  a  mere  additional  dispute  resolution  tool  next  to
traditional  litigation.  In  addition,  cybersquatting  is  universally  held  to  be  unlawful.
However, in the context of global governance the given examples are considered to
be  a  kind  of  blueprint  for  modern  forms  of  co-regulation  between  international
governmental organisations, the industry, and civil society  actors.
128  Co-regulation
[213] of the Internet with regard to the protection of privacy, children, or consumers,
for  instance,  involves  issues  which  form  an  integral  part  of  the  protective  state’s
policies  in  the  traditional  national  framework.  Here  the  commercialisation  of  the
Internet led to the question of how consumers could be provided with an effective
level of protection in cross-border contracts, where they are faced with the problems
of multi-jurisdictional litigation. Under the label of promoting “Consumer Confidence
in  E-Commerce”,  currently  there  are  established  trustmark-schemes,  codes  of
conduct,  and  online  dispute  resolution  services  in  a  self-regulatory  effort  of  the
Internet industry.
129 The private protection regimes thus created may soon evolve
into new kinds of transnational legal systems, their constitutionalisation then being an
important issue on the global agenda. The concept of a reflexive transnational law is
intended to provide a theoretical framework for the solution of these legal challenges
to come.
3. A Global Legal System or a Competitive Legal Pluralism?
I conclude with some remarks about a very difficult problem which was left more or
less open by Luhmann and which of course cannot be solved within this article: when
I talk about functionally specialized transnational  legal  systems  in  plural,  how  are
they related with each other and with national legal systems or public international
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law? Do all these systems form part of a global legal system, and if so how could the
unity of such a single system be represented?
130 Since legal communications [214]
can be distinguished from non-legal ones and are processed all over the world, one
could argue that there is a single global legal system which performs its operative
closure as an autopoietic subsystem within “world society”
131 simply on the basis of
the usage of the legal code. However, this is only part of the story, since the mere
reference to the general legal code constitutes a legal system in a very broad sense
only. The operational closure of a legal system in its strict sense is performed on the
basis of valid legal acts, i.e. actions which alter the legal situation (Geltungslage) as
the starting point for further legal decisions, e.g. legislating, contracting, adjudicating
and the like. Validity is the symbol for the unity of a legal system, since it symbolises
the interconnectability of legal communications, i.e. the autopoiesis of the elements
without which the operative closure of a legal system would not work.
132 It follows
that the decisive question in terms of the operative closure of a global legal system
is:  are  there  “validity-interfaces”  between  the  different  national,  international,  and
transnational legal systems which enable interconnectivity amongst them and thus
the autopoiesis of  a global law?
133
I  consider  this  question  to  be  an  empirical  one,  which  cannot  be  answered
sufficiently here. However, the organised professional decision-making system of a
national legal system, with the courts in its centre and legislation and contracting at
the periphery
134, as a general rule does not perceive foreign legal acts as valid law,
unless international (mutual) recognition is explicitly provided for in national law. Of
course, the existence of foreign law is not denied, but its relevance for decisions
within the national system is neglected. Even where foreign law is taken into account
at all, it often is treated as a fact to be proven (i.e. foreign reference) rather than a
legal element to be (self-) referenced according to the rule iura novit curia.
135
[215] The same holds true for the relation of domestic legal systems with the
above  described transnational  legal  systems.  If  an  arbitral  tribunal  decides  as  an
amiable compositeur, the decision is not referencing the legal code at all, it is not law
but ex aequo et bono. If the tribunal applies domestic law, the decision is just part of
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the domestic legal system where the arbitration has its seat. Once the tribunal makes
reference to lex mercatoria, however, the decision takes part in a completely different
discourse,  which  –  under  the  above  described  conditions  –  may  qualify  as  an
autopoietic  transnational  legal  system.  Both  domestic  and  transnational  legal
systems are, then, operationally closed; they may observe each other but there is no
exchange of validity, no self-reference: domestic courts do not apply non-state law, a
tribunal obliged by the choice of law of the parties to apply lex mercatoria may not
apply domestic laws. Similarly an administrative panel decides a case in accordance
with the UDRP and the Rules, while domestic courts give no deference to the panel
decisions.
136 In other words: there is no comitas.
On the other hand, global law - despite the current trend towards a legalisation of
international relations
137 - lacks the organised professional core of a decision making
system  as  long  as  there  are  no  courts  with  general  jurisdiction.
138  A  global  legal
system without jurisdiction, however, seems to be a contradictio in objectu: a lot of
periphery  without  a  centre.
139  In  the  absence  of  a  sustainable  amount  of  self-
reference,  however,  global  law  simply  does  not  qualify  for  operative  closure,  i.e.
autopoiesis in the  strict  sense. What  is  left  is  a  global  legal  system  in  the  broad
sense,  i.e.  a  global  legal  discourse  without  a  single  validity-test  (ultimate  rule  of
recognition)  [216]  symbolizing  its  unity.  Instead  the  global  legal  discourse  is
decomposed  by  a  plurality  of organised  decision  making  systems,  the  number  of
which is – triggered by the described trend towards the privatisation of civil law –
even  growing.  In  my  point  of  view  the  unitas  multiplex  of  such  global  legal
discourse
140  is  described  more  adequately  by  the  notion  of  a  “competitive  legal
pluralism”, than with the term “global legal system”, where “system” in its systems
theoretical meaning indicates an operative closure which is not (yet) observable.
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